Researchers led by Dr. Scott Humphreys examined raw interference data captured in Amsterdam and Trondheim during a GPS jamming event on Feb. 11, 2026. By comparing arrival times they derived a quasi‑hyperboloid surface extending tens of thousands of kilometres, with a five‑meter error margin, that pinpointed the source satellite. The team shared preliminary results at the Institute of Navigation conference in Baltimore, prompting wider scrutiny.

Mapping that surface against known orbits left a single match: the Russian satellite Kosmos 2546, part of the EKS (Edinaya Kosmicheskaya Sistema) constellation. Six EKS satellites occupy highly elliptical Molniya trajectories that linger over high latitudes, ensuring at least one platform remained above the horizon for every ground station throughout each interference burst. These orbits grant continuous coverage across Europe during daylight hours.

The jamming signal sits slightly offset from the standard GPS band, suggesting a deliberate test rather than accidental spillover. Analysts fear the capability could be tuned to the exact GPS frequency in a conflict, delivering continent‑scale denial of service. The findings prove Russia can weaponize its early‑warning satellites against civilian navigation infrastructure.