2003年5月，威斯康星大学- Madison发现自己接收到针对校园公共网络时间协议（NTP）服务器的持续大规模入站互联网流量。这种淹没流量速率为数十万至数百万数据包每秒，以及数百兆比特每秒。随后，我们确定了这种淹没的来源是全球数十万台真实的互联网主机。然而，这并没有以恶意的分布式拒绝服务（DDoS）攻击的形式出现，根本原因实际上是数十万台该厂商面向住宅用户的低成本互联网产品设计上的严重缺陷。这些产品的异常行为对威斯康星大学- Madison 带来了数年之久的重大运营问题。本文件包括了这些产品严重设计缺陷细节的初始公开披露。Furthermore, it discusses our ongoing, multifaceted approach toward the solution which involves the University, the products' manufacturer, the relevant Internet standards (RFCs), and the public Internet service and user communities. Initial Flood Figure 1 is a graph of inbound traffic to our campus over a 48 hour period, Tuesday through Thursday, May 13-15, 2003. The first half of the graph shows typical traffic levels for our campus, with peak inbound packet rates of about 40,000 packets-per-second.

However, as you can see, our inbound packet-per-second rate increased dramatically starting May 14 at about 8AM local time, primarily from our commodity Internet Service Provider, Wisc Net.