A technical analysis posted to GitHub reveals Starlink terminals in Iran faced sophisticated GPS interference during a government internet shutdown. Debug telemetry from January 2026 shows the dish detected spoofing signals and activated countermeasures, yet struggled to maintain a stable connection. The data confirms consumer satellite gear is now a direct target in state-level electronic warfare.

The terminal tracked 18 GPS satellites but flagged them as untrustworthy, inhibiting positioning to avoid fake signals. This response indicates spoofing rather than simple jamming. Performance suffered immediately: the dish never achieved a stable link, and packet loss averaged 20%. The system also imposed bandwidth restrictions to cope with degraded inputs.

Without reliable GPS, the terminal relied on fallback positioning, causing pointing errors over one degree. This misalignment degraded beam tracking and throughput. While the radio link remained functional, the 24-minute test never stabilized. Such interference forces terminals into degraded modes, prioritizing basic connectivity over optimal performance.

This report documents how Iranian authorities can degrade but not block Starlink. SpaceX has long designed for resilience, yet this telemetry proves attacks work. Expect future hardware revisions to harden anti-spoofing algorithms. The cat-and-mouse game between satellite providers and state censors just escalated dramatically.