A group of 21 computer scientists specializing in election security has issued a stark warning against internet voting, declaring it inherently insecure. They argue that despite vendors' claims, no current or foreseeable technology can make internet voting safe. The scientists, signed by Andrew Appel, emphasize that internet voting systems are more vulnerable than traditional paper ballots, as a small number of people can alter votes undetected.

The report outlines three primary weaknesses in internet voting: malware on voter devices, server vulnerabilities, and vulnerabilities at election offices. Unlike paper ballots, which require significant effort to tamper with in large quantities, internet ballots offer a single point of attack that can compromise many votes. This vulnerability has been known for years, yet vendors continue to promote such systems.

The scientists also debunk claims about End-to-End Verifiable Internet Voting (E2E-VIV) systems, which are supposed to allow voters to verify their votes. They point out that these systems are complex and counterintuitive, often requiring voters to rely on apps that could be compromised by malware. The report highlights that even when voters detect cheating, there is no effective dispute resolution protocol, making it impossible to prove or rectify the issue.

Bradley Tusk's VoteSecure system, touted as a secure solution, is criticized for its own set of insecurities. The developers admit that it lacks receipt-freeness and has no effective dispute resolution. The scientists conclude that the push for internet voting by entities like the Mobile Voting Foundation is misleading and dangerous, as it risks undermining public trust in elections.