The New York Times argues the United States' strategy towards Iran risks escalating a non-nuclear deterrent threat. Iran's ability to close the Strait of Hormuz and threaten Gulf infrastructure acts as a credible, albeit asymmetric, deterrent. Unlike nuclear weapons, this threat relies on distributed capabilities like missile launchers and control over key chokepoints, making it vulnerable to attrition but potent in its immediate impact. The closure would cause severe global energy market disruption, spiking prices and economic instability.

The core issue is the U.S. 'decapitation campaign' pushing Iran into an existential corner, forcing it towards extreme, potentially economically devastating moves. This strategy, aimed at regime change, inadvertently makes Iran's apocalyptic threats more rational. The alternative—diplomacy without regime change—could reduce these threats' credibility, leveraging America's conventional military strength to inflict economic pain if Iran persists.

While a diplomatic settlement avoids a costly land war and global economic rout, it may represent a strategic setback for U.S. power, a disappointment Washington might have to accept over a catastrophic military escalation.