China’s satellite program has moved from peaceful research to a textbook‑backed doctrine that treats space as a contested battlefield. The PLA’s 2024 manual outlines tactics ranging from capturing satellites to attacking Earth targets, signalling a shift that could pressure commercial space operators and defense contractors across the globe.

Last April, a US‑built monitoring satellite, USA 324, observed two Chinese craft, TJS‑16 and TJS‑17, performing close‑range manoeuvres that U.S. officials dubbed ‘dogfighting in space’. The incident underlined Beijing’s growing proficiency in proximity operations, a skill that could enable it to seize or disable rival assets at GEO, 36,000km above Earth.

The Shijian‑21 satellite, launched in 2022, demonstrated a robotic arm’s ability to tow a defunct Beidou node into graveyard orbit, proving that Beijing can capture GEO objects and repurpose or destroy them. Such capabilities raise the stakes for satellite insurance firms and could trigger a surge in defensive spending by U.S. and European operators.

Defense contractors eyeing space assets now face a new calculus: investing in hardened platforms, counter‑space systems, and quantum‑key distribution links could become essential. The PLA’s focus on synthetic aperture radar from GEO offers persistent, all‑weather imaging, a capability that could shift the cost‑benefit equation for future satellite design and procurement.