Harvard Law Review examines the fundamental question of what tort law actually is and why it exists. The article traces two competing theories that have shaped legal thinking for decades: the instrumentalist view that tort law promotes social welfare by disincentivizing harmful behavior, and the moralist perspective that tort law recognizes and redresses interpersonal wrongs.

Over the twentieth century, the instrumentalist account gained dominance in American legal culture, while common law jurisdictions elsewhere maintained that tort law is "inextricably interwoven" with interpersonal morality. The debate centers on whether torts like negligence and battery are primarily about preventing social harm or about addressing moral wrongs between individuals. This philosophical divide reflects deeper questions about law's proper role in society.

The article challenges the prevailing "Palsgraf perspective" that tort law exists to recognize relational wrongs between parties. Instead, it argues that torts are better understood as "remedial pigeonholes" - legal frameworks that determine when defendants must compensate plaintiffs regardless of whether they've acted wrongfully. Drawing on civil law examples from Italy and Germany, the author suggests tort law ultimately concerns moral responsibility for unjust damage rather than interpersonal mistreatment.