The debate over whether digital minds are conscious is split between physicalist and computationalist camps. The author, a panpsychist, argues that claims denying consciousness to specific systems are unsubstantiated and that consciousness may be substrate‑independent.

He distinguishes functional introspection from phenomenal introspection, noting that the correlation between them remains unresolved. He questions the raw substrate underpinning phenomenal consciousness—whether computation, quantum coherence, electromagnetic fields, or all—and whether consciousness is binary, gradient, or universal, invoking panpsychism.

The author contends that digital hardware may host consciousness, but its architecture, built for deterministic computation, likely blocks self‑reflective phenomenal introspection. Current software is limited; a translation function linking physical states to qualia is required, with physicalist theories favored for simplicity.

He calls for empirical research to inform hardware design that safeguards the welfare of digital minds, warning against a future society of powerful yet unconscious AI. He references Bostrom’s Disneyland scenario, preferring an empirical pragmatist stance over p‑zombie denial.