A yuvadm/quantumslop GitHub branch replaces IBM Quantum's QPU with /dev/urandom in a Q-Day Prize submission, claiming ECDLP key recovery on 17-bit curves. The 59-line patch swaps the IBM backend for os.urandom, replying all circuit steps unaltered. Testing shows both methods recover keys at statistically indistinguishable rates.

The demo uses projecteleven.py with a 29/-/30-line patch: it generates uniform-random bitstrings of the circuit's classical register width (e.g., 49 bits for 16-bit challenges) instead of running quantum shots. For 17-bit curves (the prize-winning curve), the demo runs 20,000 shots per attempt, recovering the key 1,441 times in 5 attempts—matching the author's reported hardware results.

Theoretical analysis shows success probability under uniform noise: for 16-bit, 20,000 shots give ~46% success; for 17-bit, ~26%. Empirical results align: 16-bit recovered 20,248/20,000 attempts, 17-bit 1,441/5. The author's README even predicts this, stating 'random noise alone can recover d with high probability' when shots >> n.

The critique centers on the cryptanalytic claim: the demo lacks quantum contribution. Key recovery was achieved classically via uniform-random candidates—reproducible without quantum hardware. No IBM account or token was needed to replicate the results, exposing the submission's reliance on classical verification rather than quantum computation.