Europe has invested over €2 billion in sovereign cloud initiatives through programs like IPCEI-CIS, aiming to escape US legal jurisdiction over data. France's SecNumCloud framework promises immunity from extraterritorial laws with nearly 1,200 technical requirements. Yet most certified cloud operators still depend on Intel and AMD processors, creating a fundamental contradiction in digital sovereignty efforts.

The silicon itself harbors hidden risks. Both chipmakers embed management engines that operate below the operating system at Ring -3 privilege level. Intel's Management Engine (ME) and AMD's Platform Security Processor (PSP) run independently with their own memory, network stack, and power management. These systems remain active even when devices appear powered off, capable of network communication invisible to host firewalls.

Security researchers have demonstrated real exploitation. Microsoft documented the PLATINUM group using Intel's Serial-over-LAN for covert data exfiltration, bypassing all host-based security tools. The ME doesn't require vulnerabilities—it exploits designed features. In server environments, Baseboard Management Controllers (BMC) present even greater risks, offering remote administration capabilities that can fully compromise datacenter hardware.

The RISAA 2024 law amplifies these concerns by classifying hardware manufacturers as "electronic communications service providers" subject to secret government orders. European sovereignty frameworks certify cloud software but ignore silicon-level vulnerabilities. This creates an unbridgeable gap where certified clouds remain exposed to hardware-level compromise through American-designed processors operating under US legal authority.